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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE S,_f ATE OF UTAH
PA R L E Y )lORTEXSU:\ an<l
EDITH i\IOHTENSON. i1ts "·ii'(',
ROY l\lORTEN SON a1HI \' F,JL\
~IORTENSON, his wife
Plaintiff's r111d Urs,1i,,11drnls,
\' s.

FINANCIAL URO\\''l'll. I :\l'.,
PROFESSION AL l: .:\ 1 T E D
REALTY, FLOYD E. BENTOX
and GLEN H. ~1ILNEB,

Case No.
11343

Defcnda11ls (///(/ • J;JJJcl/"11/s.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

STATEl\IENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is a suit for a judgment declaring that the
defeudant, J;"'inancial Growth. Inc. had breached a
agreement for the installment sale of real property and
that the plaintiffs have the right to terminate such
agreement.
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DISPOSITION IK LO\VER COURT
The trial l'.ourt granted Uw plaintiffs' mutio11 for
a summary judgment dedariug thai- the agreement had
been brearhe<l, an<l that the plaintiffs have a right to
terminate it, and <lismissing the defendants' counterclaim.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respoudents seek affirmance of the declaratory
judgment.

STATEl\IENT OF FACTS
The appellants' statement of facts is confusing,
is nut based upon or referenced to the record and is not
confined to the issues before the trial court and before
this court. The respondents submit the following statement.
The respondents, hereinafter referred to as the
"Sellers., and the appellant, Financial Growth, Inc.,
hereinafter referred to as the "Buyer," entered into an
agreement dated August 25, 1U67, (R. 4-42) for the
sale of real property in ~Jorgan County, Utah, which
included some 14,000 acres of land, a home, grazing
rights and ,._,·ater rights. The sales price was $537,000.00,
to be adjusted up or down depending on the actual
acreage after a title search ( R. 6) . The contract pro-
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rnles for pa ymcn l of $:3,000.00 earnest mo11ey 11 po11
1·xecution of the agr{'erne11t awl ~13~, 7;w.oo 011 Dec..eu1hcr I, HW7 " (or au adj uste<l amount as a nsult of
acreage adj ustme11t as above provided) ... The prmcipal
halancf' is to he paid in fi'"e years in installments ot
*70,~5.i.oo eaeh year with 5~c interest on the deferred
amount from December l, HJ<i7. There is a in·ovisio11 ior
adjustment of lhe amount of the annual payments due
I<! a ere age adj 11stmen ts. ( H. I), 7 ) There is a provision
for land release. \Ve quote:

"RELEASE: Buyer \\'ill nut receive any
land nor land release credit for the $155,700 paymeut; hO\rever, thereafter, for each dollar of
principal reduction made awl on condition that
the Buyer is not in default, Buyer, on request,
may have property in mutually satisfactory
parcels consistent with the following: . . . "
(There follows detailed pro,·isions regarding
such parcels. ( R. 8-10)
"SALES CO_M.:\IISSION: The sales commission is to be paid by the Buyer in accordance
with the agreemeut between the Buyer and Professional United llealtv and its broker, Glen R.
Jlilner and agent, Fl<;y<l E. Benton. The sales
commission is Twenty-Eight Thousand Two
Hundred and Sixty-Fi,-e Dollars ($28,265.00).
Seller is to pa~· 110 real estate sales commission
whatsoe,·er and Floyd E. Benton waives any
and all claims he ma~· han~ against the Sellers
or any of them arising nut of this transaction or
any prior listiug agreement in co1~!1ectio11 with
the sale of the :Mortenson property. (R. 10, 11)
J

The agreement provides that the possession date
is December l, 1907 ....As to the conveyance the agreement proddes:

'·DEED: The deed or deeds shall be good and
sufficient warrauty deed or deeds and shall be
in proper form fo~ recording and shall be duly
e.\ccuted and ack 11ow Iedged by Sellers so as to
convey to Purchaser the fee simple title to said
propert~· free au<l clear of all liens and encumhrallces except as stated iu thjs Agreement. The
<lced shall he delivered with the necessary U nite<l
States Documentary stamps attached thereto
upon receipt of the payments provided herein."
(R. 11, 12)
Tlie following significant provision relates to the
nature of the title to be conveyed, to liens and encumbrances and to proof of title.

"CCHE OF ~-:NCl-:MllERANCES AND
LIENS: If Seller shall be unable to deliver or
cause to he delivered a deed or deeds conveying
the fee simple title to the property, free of all
lie11s and encumbrances except as herein stated,
and if Purchaser shall not exercise the privilege
(which Purchaser shall have) of waiving the
liens and encumbrances which shall be the basis
of such inability and accept the title in its then
condition without diminution of the purchase
price and without claim or demand against
Seller, then thf' aforesaid payments made by
Purchaser to Seller, shall be refunded without
interest to Purchaser. and each and all of the
other obligations of the parties hereto under this
Agreement shall thereupon cease, except that
Seller mar, if it so elects. haYe the privilege and
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optio11 l(1 adjourn the time for delivery of die
<leul for a period or periods uot exceediug m the
aggregate ni11ety ( 90) days in order to afford
Seller an opportuuily to cure or remo\·e any lieu
or cucumLraucc which shall be the basis of such
iuability, I \ll'chascr.s obligatio11s under this
..1.\greement meamvhilc to remain in full force
an<l effed co11ti11gc11l upon such ruring or removal within such time." ( R. 12-13)
''1\ BS TH /t CT OH TITLE lNSUllAN CE: Seller agrees to furnish an abstract
brought to elate, or at Seller's option, a policy of
title insurance in the name of the Purchaser."
(R. 15)

The complaiut filed J a11uary 17, 1968, alleges the
making of the agreement, the provision for payment
of $152,730.00 on December 1, 1967, and the failure
of the Buyer to pay. It is further alleged that the
Sellers have good and sufficient title as disclosed by
abstracts delivered to the Buyer's agent in 1966, that
~259.00 had beeu spent by the Sellers for a preliminary
title search, that the search showed that the Sellers had
more than sufficient acreage to perform the contract,
that Sellers had informed Buyer's counsel that legal
descriptions were available for cxami11atiun and that
"if monies were placed in escrow tu cover the December
1, 1967, installment payment the Sellers would procure
title insurance." That au iterim title iusurance binder
commitment has beei1 <lelin;rc<l to the Buyer and "no
payment nor escrow deposit has been made relatiYe to
thr December l, 1U67 payment." The prayer is for a
judgment deiermining that the agreemenl has been
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breached and tha l the Sellers have a right to terminate
the agreement. The second paragraph prays for the
recovery of costs and disbursements, $259.00 for thr
title search and for a reasonable attorneys fee. ( H.
2, 3)

The answer of the Buyer and Professional Gnited
Realty hereinafter referred to as the "Broker" denies
the allegation that the agreement was breached by the
Buyer, denies that the Seller has "good and sufficient
title,'' denies that Floyd E. Benton had been requested
lo return abstracts, denies for lack of information the
cost of the title search and denies that it cost $259.00.
Such defendants admit that "there may be sufficient
acreage to perform said contract but allege that this
in and of itself is not sufficient to constitute compliance
by plaintiffs." The defendants admit all other allegations of the complaint. ( R. 43, 44).
For an affirmative defense it is alleged that the
liuyers have at all times stood ready to perform upon
the condition that the Sellers would "guarantee and
provide good and sufficient fee simple title to said
property," and that the Sellers do not own the fee
simple title because of the "reservation of certain
mineral rights."
The counterclaim is for the recovery of a real
estate commission based on an attached farm listing
dated Februarv 26, 1966, for the sale of 13,890 acres
for $582,300.00 (much of which is illegible) and an
earnest money receipt and agreement dated April 25,
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for the sale of 13,280 acres for $582,;jOU.OO tu
Beehive Development Co., Inc. There is no allegation
that this earnest money agreement was executed liy
the Sellers nor ever resulted in a sale. The contrary
must be assumed because it is alleged .. subsequently,
the defendant Professional L nilcd ilealty was able to
obtain an offer to purchase said property from Financial
G-rowth, lnc., a Ilawaiian corporation, authorized to
<lo business in Utah. Pursuant to the last mentioned
offer to purchase the sales agreement appended to the
complaint was executed by the parties."
HHW,

The counterclaim further alleges that Financial
G-rowth has stood ready to perform but has been prevented from doing so by the misrepresentations of the
Seller as to the mineral rights and further that the
Sellers further delayed "the conclusion of this transaction by failing to acquire timely interest in certain
acreage involved and failing to certify such acquisition
to the Defendants." "The Defendants are entitled to a
commission of $58,000.oo" which has been "reduced to
~28,000.00 by subsequent oral agreement of the parties."
The prayer is for judgment against the Sellers and in
favor of the Broker. Professional United Realty. (R.
t4, 45).

The Sellers replied admitting the execution of the
farming listing b,,. Parley :\lorte11son only, admitting
there was an offer to purchase dated April 2.5, I 91)6,
arlmitted the execution of the agreement attached to the
co111plaint. and nrlmitted thal in 51ome patents from the

United States and the State of Utah oil, gas, coal and
other mineral rights are reserved. It is alleged that the
Buyers had actual or constructive notice of the reservations. The other allegations in the counterclaim are
denied. ( R. 55, 56)
The Buyers filed a motion for a summary judgment worded as follows:
"Come now the plaintiffs above named and
moYc the above entitled court for an order granting to the plaintiffs a summary judgment
against the defendants and each of them declaring that the real estate co11tract described in the
complaiut has been breached by the defendant,
Financial Growth, Inc., and that the plaintiffs
have a right to terminate said agreement. Plaintiffs further pray for a summary judgment dismissing the counter-claim of the defendants,
Firnmcial Growth, Lie. and Professional United
Realty.
This motion is made upon the ground that
there is no genuine issue of fact between the
plaintiffs and any of the defendants.
This motion is based upon the files and records
herein and upon the affidavit of Parley .Mortenson attached hereto and made a part hereof."
(R. 57)
The affidavit of Parley :Mortenson states that
demand was made on the Buyer for payment of the
installment due December 1, 1967, in the amount of
$152,730.00 and it was refused and that no payment
has been made e>.cept $3,000.00 paid about the date of
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execution of the agreement. It is further stated that the
Seller has at all times been and now is ready, able aud
willing to perform all obligatious of the Seller as and
when they become due. ( R. 59, 60).
The affidavit of Floyd E. Benton in behalf of
Professional United Realty, Inc. states that the farm
listing agreement was executed by one of the plaintiffs,
that a11 offer to purchase was obtained from Beehive
Development Co., that said Buyer was ready, able and
willing to perform according to the offer to sell but that
said sale was not consumated through no fa ult of the
Broker. It recites that subsequently the Broker ha<l
obtained a second offer to purchase the same property
from Financial Growth, Inc. (the Buyer) who was
ready, willing and able to perform. That the Broker
has earned and is entitled to receive a commission notwithsta.ndfog any difficulty which may have arisen
between the Seller and the Buyer.

l t should be noted that a man named Perry Holley
signed the Earnest .i\'Ioney Jleceipt and Off er to Purchase in behalf of Beehive Development Co., Inc. as
"president," (R. 47) and also the agreement dated
August 25, 1967, for Financial Growth, Inc. as "agent
and advisor." (R. 16).
The trial court made an order granting the motion
for &ummary judgment which reads as follows;
"The plaintiffs' Motion for Summary J udgment h;:n1ng come on regularly for hea!ing be-·
fore the above entitled court on ~lay 3, 1968,
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and on June 27, 1968, the court having heard
argument of counsel and being fuily advised in
the premises, and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS ORDEHED that the plaintiffs' l\'Iotion
for Summary Judgment be and it is hereby
granted." ( R. 65) .

STATE_MENT OF POINTS
1. The judgment declaring a breach of contract

and a right to termination is fuUy supported by the
record and the law.
2. The counterclaim was properly dismissed.

ARGUMENT
THE JUDGMENT DECLARING A
BREACH OF CONTRACT AND A RIGHT TO
TERl\Il:NATlON IS FULLY SUPPORTED BY
THE RECORD AND THE LAW.
1.

It will be noted that Rule .56 (a) permits the
plaintiff to file a motion for a summary judgment in
his favor "upon alI or any part of a claim."
Rule 56 ( c) so far as -pertinent here provides:
" ... The judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if _the pleadings~ depositions, answers
to interrogatories, a~d. admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law .... "
-
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In the case of Bullock v. Deseret Dodge True/.;
Center, 11 Utah 2d. 1, 354 P.2d. 559 after referri1w
0
to the words of tl1e rule stated above lhe court sai<l:
"Such showing must preclude all reasonable
possibility that the loser could, if given a trial,
produce evidence which would reasonably sustain a judgment in his favor .... "

l t will be noted that the Sellers filed their motion
for the following relief: ( l) a declaration that the
Buyer had breached the agreement, ( 2) that the Sellers
have a right to terminate it, and (3) dismissal of the
counterclaim. We will confine our argument to the
issues presented by the motion for summary judgment.
The agreement, under the heading "Payment"
required the Buyer to pay to the Seller $152,730.00 on
December I, 1967. (R. 7). It is not denied in the answer
that the payment was not made (R. 43) and the
statement in the affidavit of Parley Mortenson attached
to the motion for summary judgment that the payment
had not been made (R. 59) is not controverted in the
only counter affidavit filed by any defendant. (R. 63,
64) . The failure to make the initial payment must
therefore be considered admitted. By inference, the
failure to pay is admitted in appellants' brief, p. II.
The Buyer's sole excuse for failure to pay is that
s01ne of the land· was subject" to mineral reservations.
See Answer (R. 44) ~nd Counterclaim (R. 45).
In the cf:ise. of lVoodarq v. Alle!L, 1 Utah 2d~_ 220,
265 P.2d 398, this court had before it a similar situation.
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The plaintiff and defendant made an agreement for
the sale of property and the def endaut delivered a check
for $500.00 as a down payment and agreed to pay an
a<lditional $27 ,000.00 in one month. The defendant
made several objections to the agreement and stopped
payment on his check. The plaintiff sued. In his
amended answer the defendaut questioned the marketability of the plaintiff's title. This court held:
" ... Defendant's attack 011 the marketability
of plaintiffs title was premature, since, under
the authorities, that fact is determinable, not as
of the <late of execution of the contract, but as of
the time a Yendee tenders that which, under the
contract, would require the vendor to transfer
uot only marketable title, but the title which the
latter agreed to cmIYey.
II ere the defendant reneged in 24 hours, a
month before the second payment was due, and
5 years before the plaintiffs could demand final
payment, neither tendering nor evidencing an
inclination to pay any further sum under the
contract. Under these facts, plaintiffs were not
obliged to prove marketable title simply because
defendant raised the point. . . . "
There is nothing in the record in the present case
which would require the Seller to transfer a marketable
title or would entitle tbe Buyer to raise a question on
the reserved mineral rights or to raise any other title
question until the Seller was obligated to deliver a deed.
Under the heading "Release" (R. 8) the agreement is
crystal clear that the Buyer is not entitled to a deed to
any land upon payment of the first $155, 730.00 which
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amount is the $3,000.00 payment plus the payment of
$1.5~,730.00 due on December 1, 1967.
For other cases holding that the Buyer's excuse for
non payment of the installment is without merit see:
Naylor v. Jolley, 100 Utah 130, 111 P.2d. 142.
Coughran v. Bigelow (Utah), 164 U.S. 801, 41

L. Ed. 442.

92 C.J.S. p. 83.

It will be noted that in the affidavit of Parley
Mortenson attached to the motion for a summary judgment it is stated that the Seller made demand on the
purchaser for payment of the December 1, 1967 installment in the amount of $152,730.00 and payment was
refused. The affidavit is dated April 26, 1968. (R. 59)
The facts stated therein are not disputed.

It is the law that a refusal by the buyer to perform
an executory contract of sale of land warrants a termination.
91 C.J.S. 1071.

Under elementary rules of contract law the Seller
has a right to terminate an executory contract because
of the substantial non-performance or breach of the
Buyer.
17A C.J.S. p. 516.

The question as to what constitutes a substantial
breach depends upon the peculiar circumstances of each
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case. It is said that a breach must go to the root of the
contract.
17.A C.J .S. pp. 518, 519.

\ V illiston <liscusses and states the rule as follows:

""Nevertheless there arc mauy cases where the
injured party is content merely tu terminate
his legal relations with the other party to the
contract without more. That he may do this
seems clearly established both in England and
in the United States .... This right may become
o±~ great importance if the contract while it
exists, operates as a threatened liability or a
cloud on title .. , 5 vVilliston on Contracts pp.
4100, 4101. Res Contracts, Sec. 410.
"In truth rescission is imposed in invitum by
the law at the option of the injured party, and
it should be, and in general is, allowed not only
for repudiatiou or total inability, but also for
any breach of contract of so material and substantial a nature as would constitute a defense
to an action brought by the party in default for
a refusal to proceed with the contract." 5 Williston on Contracts, Rev. Ed. p. 4106.
The answer does not allege that the Buyer has
tendered the first installment paymeut or is ready,
willing or able to perform in accordance with the contract, nor is it stated in any pleading nor is it argued
that there was not a repudiation of the agreement by the
Buyer.
The payment of $152,730.00 at the time possession
is to be deliYered certainly goes to the root of the con-
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tract withiu the meaning of the rules quoted above, and
would certainly constitute a defense to an action i'iled
by party in default within the meaning of the rule stated
h~' \V illiston.
The failure of the Buyer to pay the first installment under the circumstances set out in the contract
entitles the Seller to terminate the contract. The important circumstances in addition to non-payment on
the due dak which justify termination include the
following:
(a) The refusal of the Buyer to pay based on the
usual reservations in land patents of oil and minerals.
(R. 44, 56}
(b) The large purchase price $537,000.00 and the
small down payment, or as it is referred to in the
agreement, "earnest money." (R. 6)
( c) The provision that possession was to be delivered on December 1, 1967. ( R. 11 )
(d) The agreement that the Sellers would attempt
to sell their livestock before December l, 1967. (R. 11)
( e) The requirement that the winter range be
leased if the livestock are not sold by December 1, 1967.
(R. 11)

(f) The requirement that the livestock be removed
from the real property by December 1, 1968. (R. 11)
( g) The fact that the ranch property was a home
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for livestock which fluctuate in price and are perishable.
(R. 11)
( h) The agreement does not require the c01n-eyance of the oil and mineral rights with the land but
requires only that title be conveyed free of all hens
and encumbrances. ( H. 12) The excuse based on reservations of oil and mineral rights was an afterthought
to justify non-payment of the installment.
"The fact that time is of the essence of a contract may appear from the nature of the property
or the objects which the parties had in view." 91
C.J.S. p. 1004.
The circumstances set out above show that time
of payment is of the essence of the contract.
The Buyer contends that the motion for summary
judgment should not have been granted because the
pleadings present "bona fide issues of material facts,"
as follows:
( 1) The issue as to whether the Sellers had good
and sufficient title. (App. Br. 6).
(2) 'Vho should pay the costs and disbursements.

(App. Br. 7, 8).
( 3) 'Vhether or nut Parley .:Mortenson was a
partner. (App. Br. 8).

( 4) Whether the real estate broker had obtained
a buyer ready, willing and able to perform. (App.
Br. 8),
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( 5) 'Vhether the Sellers failed to obtain a timely
interest in certain acreage involved. (App. Br. 8).

In view of the fact that the motion for summary
judgment is confined to the issues as to whether there
was a breach of contract, the right of the Sellers to
terminate and the dismissal of the counterclaim, the
issues numbered (1), (2), (3), and (5) had no importance in the trial court nor before this Court.
Further, as to the issue regarding the obligation of the
Buyer to pay certain title costs of $259.00, that is not
of any importance in the consideration of the issues
raised by the motion. The claim in the appellants' brief
pp. 17-19 that the trial court should have ordered the
refund to the Buyer of the $3,000.00 paid on the agreement was not pleaded, was not argued in the trial court
and was for the first time argued on appeal. It is also
a matter which is not within the issues raised by the
motion.
The issue ( 3) regarding the counterclaim is discussed under the next heading.
2. THE COUNTERCLAI~I WAS PROP-

ERLY DISl\'IISSED.

The counterclaim of Professional United Realty
for $~8,000.00 is based upon a farm listing agreement
dated February 26, 1966. It does not mention Professional United Realty but is accepted by Floyd E.
Renton. It is a listing for six months. The earnest money
offer from Beehive Development Co. dated April 25,
17

1966, was not accepted. It is pl~inly inferred in paragraph 2 of the counterclaim that this offer was aban-

doned in favor of the offer of Financial Growth, Inc.
It is significant that one Perry Holley signed as
president of Beehive and as "agent and advisor" of
Financial Growth, Inc. ( R. 16 and 47) . The first of fer
never having Leen accepted, the agreement v.•ith Financial Growth, J nc. being dated about one year after the
Floyd E. Benton listing expired, and there being no
listing with Professional United Realty or any assignment from Benton to the counterclaimant, it is obvious
that the counterclaim was properly dismissed.
Also, it should be noted that the agreement in suit
upon which the counterclaim for commission was based
provides on pp. 10 and 11 as follows:
"SALES COl\'11\IISSlON: The sales commission is to be paid by the Buyer in accordance
with the Agreement between Buyer and Professional United Realty and its broker, Glen R.
.Milner, and agent, Floyd E. Benton. The sales
commission is Twenty-Eight Thousand Two
Hundred and Sixty-Five Dollars ($28,265.00).
Seller is to pay no real estate sales commission
whatsoever and Floyd E. Benton waives any
and all claims he may have against the Sellers
or any of them arising out of this transaction
or any prior listing agreement in connection with
the sale of the :Mortenson property."
There is no pleading or statement by affidavit that
the agreement between the Buyer and the real estate
broker did not exist or should be disregarded. It is con-
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elusive that the Broker agreed to take its commission
from the Buyer and expressly waived any claim again -:t
the Seller. Floyd E. Benton is referred to in the complaint as "purchasers agent," ( R. 2) and this is not
denied in the answer. (R. 43). The fact that Professional United Realty did not sign the agreement which
it is claimed is the fruit of its labor has no significance
in Yiew of the foregoing facts.

CONCLUSION
The motion for summary judgment confined as it
was to the issues of breach of the agreement dated
August 25, 1967, the right of the Sellers to terminate
such agreement, and the dismissal of the counterclaim
was properly granted because there were no genuine
issues of fact as to such matters raised by the pleadings
or controverted by affidavit. The plaintiffs were as a
matter of law entitled to the relief granted.
Respectfully Submitted,

MILO S. MARSDEN
E. J. SKEEN
Attorneys for Respondents
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